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Abstract   
The paper explores the determinants of yield differentials between sovereign bonds in the Euro area. There is a 
common trend in yield differentials, which is correlated with a measure of aggregate risk. In contrast, liquidity 
differentials display sizeable heterogeneity and no common factor. We propose a simple model with endogenous 
liquidity demand, where a bond’s liquidity premium depends both on its transaction cost and on investment 
opportunities. The model predicts that yield differentials should increase in both liquidity and risk, with an 
interaction term of the opposite sign. Testing these predictions on daily data, we find that the aggregate risk factor 
is consistently priced, liquidity differentials are priced for a subset of countries, and their interaction with the risk 
factor is in line with the model’s prediction and crucial to detect their effect. 
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  1 Introduction
The European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 brought to life an integrated
market for ﬁxed-income securities in the Euro-area. EMU eliminated cur-
rency risk within this area, and standardization of bond conventions by
Euro-area sovereign issuers made public bonds issued by diﬀerent Euro-area
governments close substitutes. Consequently, yield spreads on Euro-area gov-
ernment bonds converged signiﬁcantly, narrowing from highs in excess of 300
basis points, for certain maturities, to less than 30 basis points across the
maturity spectrum less than a year after the introduction of EMU. Yet, de-
spite such convergence, euro-zone government bonds are still not regarded
as perfect substitutes by market participants: non-negligible diﬀerences in
yield levels across countries have remained, to diﬀerent extents for diﬀerent
issuers and maturities, and they ﬂuctuate over time. Even the bonds issued
by AAA-rated issuers are not regarded as perfect substitutes of each other, so
that for example French bonds traded in the cash market are not considered
as a perfect hedge for positions in Bund futures.1
What is the reason for these persistent diﬀerentials? One possible expla-
nation is persistent risk diﬀerences. Diﬀerent sovereign issuers are perceived
as having diﬀerent solvency risks, in spite of the provisions of the Stability
Pact. A second possible explanation is liquidity. This is indeed the explana-
tion that is often advanced by practitioners.
However, a look at the time-series behavior of Euro-area yield diﬀerentials
suggests that neither one of these two factors in isolation is likely to provide
the full answer. First, as shown below, the yield diﬀerentials relative to
t h eG e r m a nB u n dt e n dt oﬂuctuate together, much more than measures of
liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads, do. This suggests that liquidity alone
cannot be the full answer, and that there must be other factors driving
the diﬀerentials’ time-series behavior. Such factors are likely to be related
to international investment opportunities or risk perceptions. For instance,
even if the default risk of the Italian and French governments relative to the
German one were very stable over time, a changing world price for risk could
induce the implied yield diﬀerentials to correlate over time. But this cannot
be the full story either. Sizable yield diﬀerentials have been observed for
several years even within the group of AAA-rated euro-zone countries, even
1See Pagano and von Thadden (2004) for an account of the integration of European
bond markets and for a survey of the relevant literature.
1though they have generally narrowed considerably over time. Still, as late
as 2002, 10-year AAA-rated Finnish debt yielded on average 20 basis points
more than the 10-year German Bund. This suggests that indeed liquidity
diﬀerences may play a role, as practitioners claim.2
As a possible explanation of this phenomenon we develop a simple asset-
pricing model with exogenous transactions costs and endogenous liquidity
demand. The model is kept deliberately simple in order to isolate the impli-
cations of our key assumption of price-elastic liquidity demand, which can be
seen already under risk neutrality and using ﬁrst moments. A more general
model with risk and risk aversion is outlined in the appendix. The most im-
portant insight of our theoretical analysis is that liquidity matters for pricing,
but that it interacts with aggregate factors in a way that is diﬀerent from
what traditional CAPM-like asset pricing models would predict.
CAPM models of liquidity such as Acharya and Pedersen (2004) assume
that the demand for liquidity is inelastic, which implies that increased illiq-
uidity must be compensated by higher returns and that this eﬀect is ampli-
ﬁed by the impact of market risk on returns. Our model instead assumes
that the demand for liquidity is price-elastic and decreases if market risk
increases. As a result, it predicts that, although illiquidity increases returns
(as in any sensible pricing model), its eﬀect is dampened by an increase in
risk. Intuitively, the reason is that in our setting an increase in aggregate
risk worsens the risk-return proﬁle of alternative investments (such as pri-
vate equity) compared to that of marketable ones: these alternative assets
are real investment opportunities, for which no price eﬀect compensates for
the increased risk. So at times of high risk, investors become less inclined
to liquidate marketable assets to move into alternative investments. As the
demand for liquidity falls, the more liquid of the marketable assets end up
earning a lower premium than in normal times.
2For instance, the increase of yield diﬀerentials relative to the Bund rate in late 1999
was explained as follows: “after having tested the waters of Europe’s smaller bond mar-
kets, institutional investors are deciding they’ve had enough ... declining liquidity in the
smaller debt markets is boosting the premiums these countries are having to pay investors
compared with the core euro-zone nations” (Wall Street Journal Europe, November 3,
1999). Market practitioners clearly attribute remaining yield diﬀerentials to liquidity pre-
mia, which are held to be larger in thinner markets, irrespective of their credit rating:
“‘Peripheral issuers in Europe are in trouble: They’re paying a huge liquidity premium’
says Steven Mayor, chief bond strategist at ING Barings in London. He says that their
problem comes down to the fact that some still only represent 1% to 2% of the euro-zone
issuance” (ibidem).
2The empirical implication is that, while both increases in risk and illiq-
uidity should reduce asset prices and drive up their returns, their interaction
should have the opposite sign — that is, increase asset prices and dampen the
increase in their required return. An estimation that ignores the eﬀect caused
by the interaction of liquidity with aggregate risk is likely to underestimate
the direct impact of liquidity (as well as that of risk) on prices. We bring
these ideas to the data using two years of daily observations on yields and
liquidity variables for Euro-area sovereign bonds at the 5-year and 10-year
maturities. The results show that a standard proxy for aggregate risk — the
yield diﬀerence between U.S. corporate bonds and U.S. government bonds
at the corresponding maturity — is the single most important explanatory
variable for Euro-area yield diﬀerentials. Liquidity diﬀerentials — as proxied
by the diﬀerence between the local and the relevant reference bid-ask spread
— play a role only in a subset of countries. Whenever it appears with a
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, the bid-ask spread impacts positively the
corresponding yield relative to that of the benchmark, as any asset pricing
model would predict. However, diﬀerent from standard pricing models, its
interaction with the aggregate risk factor is negative and precisely estimated.
In other words, (i) illiquidity appears to command a premium, as in most of
the literature following Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and (ii) the size of
such premium is reduced by covariation between the cost of illiquidity and
aggregate risk.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2
sets the paper in the context of the relevant literature. Section 3 presents
the data and describes the stylized facts that emerge from them. Section 4
lays out the model and its predictions. Section 5 presents and discusses the
estimation results. Section 6 concludes. In an appendix, we generalize the
basic model used in the main text to include uncertainty and risk aversion.
A short second appendix describes our data.
2 Related literature
This paper adds to a considerable literature on the relation between returns
and liquidity. At a theoretical level, two main views have been advanced
to explain why liquidity should be priced by ﬁnancial markets: illiquidity
(i) creates trading costs, and (ii) can itself create additional risk. These
views are not mutually exclusive, although they have emerged sequentially
3in the literature. This paper builds on the ﬁrst view and develops it in a new
direction, which is similar in spirit to that of the second view.
The “trading cost view” holds that illiquid securities must provide in-
vestors with a higher expected return to compensate them for their larger
transaction costs, controlling for fundamental risk. The prediction here
is a cross-sectional one: risk-adjusted expected return must be higher for
less liquid securities. This view, ﬁrst proposed and tested by Amihud and
Mendelson (1986), has been the basis of a vast empirical literature. Many
subsequent studies of stock-market data have conﬁrmed a signiﬁcant cross-
sectional association between liquidity (as measured by the tightness of the
bid-ask spread or trading volume) and asset returns, controlling for risk:
among these are Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Chordia, Roll and
Subrahmanyam (2000), and Datar, Naik and Radcliﬀe (1998).
Other studies have focussed on liquidity eﬀects in ﬁxed-income security
markets. Here, too, the initiators were Amihud and Mendelson (1991),
who showed that the yield to maturity of treasury notes with six months
or less to maturity exceeds the yield to maturity on the more liquid trea-
sury bills. Studies on U.S. public debt by, e.g., Warga (1992), Daves and
Ehrhardt (1993), Kamara (1994) and Krishnamurthy (2002) conﬁrmed these
ﬁndings, although using more recent data Strebulaev (2001) found that the
yield spread between bills and matched notes is much smaller than previ-
ously found, especially when bills are on-the-run. Goldreich, Hanke and
Nath (2002) have reﬁned this line of analysis by investigating the impact of
expected liquidity on securities’ prices. They analyze the prices of Treasury
securities as their liquidity changes predictably, in the transition from on-the-
run to the less liquid oﬀ-the-run status, and show that the liquidity premium
depends on the expected future liquidity over their remaining lifetime rather
than on their current liquidity.
The “liquidity risk view”, developed in particular by Pastor and Stam-
bough (2003), highlights that liquidity is priced not only because it creates
trading costs, but also because it is itself a source of risk, since it changes
unpredictably over time. Since investors care about returns net of trad-
ing costs, the variability of trading costs aﬀects the risk of a security. In
an important paper, Acharya and Pedersen (2004) show theoretically in a
CAPM framework with overlapping generations of investors that liquidity
risk should be priced to the extent that it is correlated across assets and
with asset fundamentals, and uncover evidence consistent with this predic-
tion. Similarly, Ellul and Pagano (2006) show that the initial underpricing
4of IPO shares should compensate investors also for the expected illiquidity
and for the liquidity risk that investors face in after-market trading, and not
only for fundamental risk and adverse selection problems. Also Gallmeyer,
Holliﬁeld and Seppi (2004) propose a model of liquidity risk where traders
have asymmetric knowledge about future liquidity, so that less informed in-
vestors try to learn from the amount of current trading volume how much
liquidity there may be in the future. They show that current liquidity is a
predictor of future liquidity risk, and therefore is priced.
Our paper puts forward what may be labeled the “risk-liquidity interac-
tion view”: we point out that liquidity alters the impact of changes in risk on
current prices and yields. So here the emphasis is not on liquidity risk (in-
deed in this approach future liquidity is perfectly anticipated), but rather on
the interaction between liquidity and aggregate risk. In our model, changes
in aggregate risk aﬀect the liquidity premium that assets with lower transac-
tions costs command. This parallels the work by Vayanos (2004), who also
works with constant exogenous transactions costs. In his model, fund man-
agers are subject to withdrawals when their performance falls below a given
threshold, and therefore are more likely to liquidate at times of high volatility.
This increases the demand for liquidity, and therefore the liquidity premium
in times of high volatility. Hence, not only do increased transactions costs
increase an asset’s required yield, but this eﬀect is stronger for higher aggre-
gate risk. Our model has the same prediction regarding the direct eﬀect of
transaction costs, but the opposite prediction with respect to the interaction
term. As explained in the previous section, in our setting higher aggregate
risk makes investors less eager to trade away from the existing portfolio of
marketable assets, and therefore reduces liquidity demand and liquidity pre-
mia. Hence, while Vayanos (2004) predicts that high volatility ampliﬁes the
eﬀect of illiquidity, our models predicts a dampening.3
On the empirical front, our analysis adds to a growing recent literature on
Euro-area yield diﬀerentials. Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) estimate
models of Euro-area diﬀerentials with both monthly and daily data. Their
estimates based on monthly data show that for most countries only inter-
national risk factors, and not domestic ones, have explanatory power (the
former being proxied by U.S. bond yield spreads and the latter by national
3It is useful to emphasize that this eﬀect arises from the interaction of liquidity and the
common risk factor of government bonds. Concerning asset-speciﬁc risk, our model does
not deliver more than the standard result that higher default risk increases the yield.
5debt/GDP ratios). In their estimates of daily data (that refer to 2002 only),
macroeconomic variables are not included because they move too slowly to
allow the estimation of the impact of the domestic risk factor. Again, the
international factor is statistically signiﬁcantly for most countries, while liq-
uidity (as measured by trading volume) is signiﬁcant only for France, Greece,
the Netherlands and Spain.
Geyer, Kossmeyer and Pichler (2004) estimate with weekly data a multi-
issuer state-space version of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (1985) model of bond
yield spreads (over Germany) for four EMU countries (Austria, Belgium,
Italy, and Spain). They ﬁnd that idiosyncratic country factors have almost
no explanatory power, and yield-spread data reﬂect mainly a single (“global”)
factor, whose variation can, to a limited extent, be explained by EMU corpo-
rate bond risk (as measured by the spread of EMU corporate bonds over the
Bund yield), but by nothing else — in particular not by measures of liquidity.
Their measurement of liquidity variables is, however, at best indirect, as they
do not use data on bid-ask spreads, but rather derived measures of liquidity,
such as issue size and the yield diﬀerential between on-the-run and oﬀ-the-
run bonds. Despite the considerable diﬀerences in the methodology and data
used, both, Geyer, Kossmeyer and Pichler (2004) and Codogno, Favero, and
Missale (2003) agree on the ﬁnding that yield diﬀerentials under EMU are
driven mainly by a common risk (default) factor, related to the spread of
corporate debt over government debt, and suggest that liquidity diﬀerences
have at best a minor role in the time-series behavior of yield spreads. As
we shall see, our results, which rely on a more direct measure of liquidity
(daily bid-ask spreads), conﬁrm the former result, but also highlight that the
eﬀect of liquidity cannot be properly gauged without taking into account its
interaction with changes in the common risk factor.
Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2007) complement the MTS data on mar-
ket prices and bid-ask spreads with daily data on credit default swaps for
European sovereign bonds to disentangle empirically the problems of ﬂight
to quality and of ﬂight to liquidity. They show that credit risk and liquidity
are positively correlated across European sovereign issuers and ﬁnd, consis-
tent with previous studies, that liquidity typically is of minor importance in
explaining yields compared to credit quality. Yet, liquidity becomes an im-
portant determinant of yields in times of high market volatility, measured by
a U.S. index (VIX) or by a European one (VSTOXX). This result contrasts
with our evidence that the liquidity premium on Euro government debt tends
to be lower when aggregate risk is higher. This diﬀerence in results may arise
6from the fact that Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2006) control for country-
speciﬁc risk, but do not consider aggregate risk factors.4 In contrast, we
model risk as being driven by a common factor, consistent with the results
by Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003) and Geyer, Kossmeyer, and Pichler
(2004).5
3D a t a a n d s t y l i z e d f a c t s
The data that we use in the empirical analysis concern benchmark bonds’
prices and liquidity indicators for the Euro area, observed at daily frequencies
for the period from 1 January 2002 to 23 December 2003. The data are
collected from the Euro MTS Group’s European Benchmark Market trading
platform, and refer to a snapshot taken at 11 a.m. (Central European Time)
in all market days for the Telematico cash markets. The database contains:
(i) the best ﬁve bid and ask prices across all markets, (ii) the aggregate
quantity of all the outstanding proposals made at the best bid and best
ask prices, and (iii) the daily trading volume of each bond on the EBM.
From these data we calculate redemption yields, maturities and a range of
liquidity-related variables described in the Appendix. We consider Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain. We do not include Greece and Ireland in the sample, because in
2002 the convergence process to EMU was still ongoing for Greece, while the
Euro MTS data for Ireland become available only at a very late stage of our
sample.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the yield diﬀerentials relative to
Germany (for 10-year bonds) and France (for 5-year bonds) and the bid-ask
spreads by country. For 10-year benchmark bonds, average yield diﬀerentials
range from 4.16 and 6.94 basis points for France and the Netherlands to 14.47
and 15.50 basis points for Italy and Portugal respectively, while the range of
variation is smaller for 5-year bonds.I nb o t hc a s e s ,t h es t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n
indicates that yield diﬀerentials feature considerable time-series variability.
The statistics reported in the lower panel indicate that bid-ask spreads are
all very tight and stable over time. For 10-year benchmark bonds, average
4Other work has investigated the high-frequency impact of credit risk on corporate
bond spreads: see Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005) and Ericsson and Renault (2006).
5Another diﬀerence between the two studies lies in the data set, which refers to a largely
non-overlapping diﬀerent time period, and to a set of securities that is not identical.
7bid-ask spreads range from 2.52 and 2.86 ticks for Italy and France to 4.60
and 4.87 for Austria and Finland, respectively. German Bunds are the third
most liquid bonds after Italian and French ones in the cash market, with a
spread of 3.25 ticks. The situation is similar for 5-year bonds.
Figure 1 illustrates the time variation of 10 year yield diﬀerentials between
each country in our sample and Germany, taken as the reference country. For
clarity, we report separately the data for the Netherlands, France and Aus-
tria in the upper panel, and for all the remaining countries in the lower panel
of the Figure. Yield diﬀerentials have a clear tendency to comove. The pres-
ence of comovement is conﬁrmed by Table 2, which reports the correlation
between yield diﬀerentials over the sample period and presents a principal-
components analysis. Correlations are very high both within and between
groups, and the principal-components analysis shows that the ﬁrst principal
component explains above 90 percent of the variance of the series. Liquidity
indicators behave diﬀerently. Figure 2 shows the diﬀerence in bid-ask spreads
observed for benchmark bonds relative to German ones, for the same group-
ings of countries as those used in Figure 1. The ﬁgure reports ﬁve-days
moving averages of the daily observations to smooth volatility. Clearly, liq-
uidity indicators have a diﬀerent time pattern from yield diﬀerentials. This
is conﬁrmed by the correlations and principal-components analysis shown in
Table 2. The correlation between diﬀerentials in liquidity indicators is much
lower than that between yields diﬀerentials. Moreover, the principal- compo-
nents analysis reveals that for liquidity indicators at least six components are
needed to explain the same proportion of the total variance as that explained
by the ﬁr s tc o m p o n e n ti nt h ec a s eo fy i e l dd i ﬀerentials.
The principal-components analysis of Table 2 shows clearly that there is
a common international factor in yield diﬀerentials in Europe. In Figure 3 we
display the behavior of a variable that is often proposed in the literature as a
proxy for this factor: the spread between the yield on 10-year ﬁxed interest
rates on swaps and the yield on 10-year US government bonds. There is
ample evidence of a common trend in international bond spreads (see, for
example, Dungey et al., 2000). The empirical literature on sovereign bond
spreads in emerging markets shows that the yield of US government bonds,
t h es l o p eo ft h eU Sy i e l dc u r v ea n d r i s ki n d i c a t o r so nt h eU Sb o n dm a r k e t s ,
are the main determinants of sovereign spreads (see, for example, Eichengreen
and Mody, 2000; Barnes and Cline, 1997, and Kamin and Von Kleist, 1999,
Arora and Cerisola, 2001). Blanco (2001) and Codogno et al. (2003) use
proxies for global credit risk derived from the US yield curve in their models
8of euro-zone government security yields. Consistent with these ﬁndings and
with the results of Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2004), Figure 3 shows that
this international risk factor is strongly correlated with the ﬁrst principal
component of yield diﬀerentials in the Euro area.
4 Theoretical framework
We consider a partial-equilibrium model with three dates t =0 ,1,2.T h e r e
are two traded bonds, denoted by A and B, and a riskless asset that yields
a net return of r per period. Bond i = A,B pays its face value V with
probability qi and 0 with probability 1 − qi at date 2 and nothing at date 1.
Without loss of generality we assume that qB ≤ qA and interpret bond A as
the benchmark. The repayment probabilities of the two bonds are driven by
a common factor α. When this factor increases, both bonds are less likely to
repay: dqi/dα ≤ 0.6 T h ep u r c h a s ep r i c eo fb o n di at date 0 is p0i. The bonds
can be re-traded at date 1 at a bid price of (1 − ti)p1i,a n da s kp r i c eo fp1i,
where ti is a proportional transactions cost.
A continuum of investors h ∈ [0,1] are ready to invest at date 0 in order
to consume at date 2. Investors are risk neutral and maximize date-2 con-
sumption. Investors may want to liquidate their bonds at date 1 to invest
in alternative investment opportunities, which comprises non-marketable pri-
vate equity and human capital. The expected return of these real investments
is negatively aﬀected by aggregate factor α:
r − e
hα,
where r>0 is the maximal expected return and eh ∈ [0,e],i sap e r s o n -
speciﬁc parameter that captures investor h’s exposure to the aggregate fac-
tor. In our risk-neutral setting, the aggregate factor can be anything that
depresses the proﬁtability of real investment opportunities as well as reducing
the solvency of marketable debt, such as the likelihood or severity of macro-
economic downturns. Accordingly, the individual factor eh can be thought as
the sensitivity of a person’s private investment opportunities to this common
factor, as determined for instance by the sector of her family ﬁrm. In a model
with risk-averse investors and risky investments, the common factor α would
6Note that since we work in a risk-neutral setting, there is no need to specify the
variance-covariance structure of bond returns. We describe such an extension for the case
of risk-averse investors in the appendix.
9instead capture aggregate risk, while the individual factor eh would measure
the investor’s exposure to it. We sketch such an extension of the model in
the appendix.
The assumption that the common factor α aﬀects both the returns to
marketable assets (in our case, the occurrence of default) and those to non-
marketable investments accords with a substantial body of evidence that
ﬁnds a strong positive correlation between them, starting with the seminal
paper on private equity returns by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
In our empirical analysis, we will proxy the factor α by the diﬀerence between
the U.S. corporate swap rate and the treasury yield, a measure typically
used to describe aggregate corporate risk (although it also captures other
macroeconomic factors).
As the investor’s exposure to the aggregate factor, eh,i n c r e a s e so v e ri t s
support, the expected return of h’s investment opportunity falls. We assume
that eh satisﬁes the law of large numbers, so that uncertainty washes out in
the aggregate and individual probabilities are the same as aggregate frequen-
cies. Let us denote by G the diﬀerentiable cumulative distribution function
of eh and by g = G ´its density function.
At date 1, an investor will liquidate his holdings of bond i to invest
in his outside investment opportunity if and only if the latter’s expected




























Note that here investors liquidate their assets as a function of changing in-
vestment opportunities, and therefore as a function of market prices and
yields. In other words, in this model demand for liquidity is price-elastic.
At the interim date, investors will buy bond i only if (1) does not hold






10Hence, p1i = vi is the maximum possible price for an equilibrium at
date 1 to exist. Necessary for the existence of an equilibrium is therefore
that aggregate demand for liquidity at this price is positive, i.e. that r
is suﬃciently large. If r were too small, even the investors with the most
proﬁtable investment opportunity would value them less than their bond
holdings and no investor would ever want to sell bonds at date 1.
No-arbitrage implies that the expected yields of all assets are equalized
in equilibrium. Hence (4) must hold with equality,7 implying:










In particular, the discount rate between dates 1 and 2 is r,t h es a m ea s






(1 + r)2 =
(1 − πiti)qiV
(1 + r)2 ,
because investors have rational expectations over their future decision to
either sell (which occurs with probability πi) or hold on to the bond (which







The yield ratio between the two bonds is simpler to calculate than the yield










By using the approximation ln(1+x) ≈ x the yield diﬀerential at date 0 can
be approximated simply by:
∆Y = YB − YA ≈ πBtB − qB − πAtA + qA. (7)
This expression for the yield diﬀerential is intuitive. First, there is a
direct positive impact of transactions costs. If πi were constant, that is,
7In a closed economy with no short-selling allowed there could be an equilibrium in
which (4) holds with strict inequality. Clearly, this is of no interest in our setting.
11the probability of liquidation were not endogenously chosen by investors,
then transaction costs would, as usual, drive up yields. Equivalently, greater
bond liquidity would be associated with lower required yields. This is clear
from (7): if πi is constant and the cost tB of trading bond B increases, its
yield increases relative to that of bond A. The reason is that the buyer
of the asset anticipates trading costs that must be compensated. As these
costs only materialize if the holder trades at date 1, tB is weighed with the
probability of this event, which is πB.
The second feature of (7) is that the yield diﬀerential increases in funda-
mental risk: the higher the risk of default of, say, bond B,w h i c hi s1 − qB,
the higher its required yield compared to bond A. Given the absence of
risk aversion in our model, this is not a risk premium but simply reﬂects
the reduction in the discounted expected payoﬀ o ft h eb o n d .T h ei m p a c to f
fundamental risk and of liquidity costs on yield spreads in (7) is standard
and in line, for example, with the empirical ﬁndings of Beber, Brandt, and
Karavacz (2006) for Euro government bonds.
However, the response of bond yields to changes in liquidity and risk
become more interesting once one takes into account that the probability
of liquidation is endogenous in this model. This probability itself reacts
to changes in both transaction costs (the terms at which the “supply of
liquidity” is available) and outside investment opportunities (that determine
the “demand for liquidity” by market participants). Indeed, as we shall see,
it also depends non-trivially on the interaction between the two.
As one would expect, both higher transaction costs (higher ti) and less at-
tractive aggregate investment opportunities (higher α)r e d u c eag i v e nb o n d ’ s






























Intuitively, if transactions costs increase, i.e. the bond becomes less liquid,
then liquidating it becomes less attractive, hence the probability of selling
decreases. Similarly, if the aggregate risk factor increases, the investors’ mar-
ket investment opportunities become less attractive, which again decreases
their probability of selling the bond.8
8We do not report the joint eﬀect of an increase in transaction costs and in aggregate
12Equipped with these results, we can now explore how risk and liquidity
aﬀect bond yields in our simple model. For simplicity, we perform the com-
parative statics of the yield diﬀerential (7) with respect to tB only (the eﬀect




























The ﬁr s tt e r mi n( 1 0 )i sp o s i t i v e ,t h es e c o n dn e g a t i v e .H e n c e ,t h es i g ni sa
priori ambiguous. This ambiguity reﬂects two opposing eﬀects — a direct and
an indirect one. The direct eﬀect of higher transactions costs is to drive up
the price by a factor πB: with exogenous liquidation probability, this would
be the only eﬀect, as observed above in discussing (7). But when liquidation
is endogenously determined, this eﬀect is at least partly counteracted by a
reduction of the trading probability, as described in (8). As this probability
decreases, the relative price of the bond increases, because liquidation costs
are incurred less often. Hence, this eﬀect is proportional to tB.T ot h ee x t e n t
that empirically bid-ask spreads in the bond market are very small (see Table
1 ) ,w ee x p e c tt h el a t t e re ﬀect to be small in absolute terms and the overall
eﬀect to be positive.
The impact of risk on yield diﬀerentials in (11) has ﬁrst two terms of
s m a l ls i z ea n do p p o s i t es i g n ,s ot h a to n ew o u l de x p e c ti t so v e r a l ls i g nt o
depend mainly on the sign of the third term ∂(qA −qB)/∂α, which measures
the impact of aggregate risk on the fundamental risk of the two bonds. Two
possibilities exist in principle. First, the eﬀect of aggregate risk is similar
for both bonds, in which case the term is approximately zero. Alternatively,
the riskier bond is more sensitive to aggregate risk than the safer one, in
w h i c hc a s ew eh a v e∂(qA−qB)/∂α > 0. In this case, we have the well-known
“ﬂight to quality”: an increase in aggregate risk makes the safer bond more
risk, ∂2πi/∂ti∂α. In our model, this cross-derivative cannot be signed unambiguously, but
is positive for several examples of distributions G, including the uniform distribution. If
it is positive, an increase in transactions costs (i.e. a decrease in liquidity) reduces the
absolute value of the impact of the aggregate factor on trading volume πi, hence, there is
a ﬂight to liquidity. Yet, as we shall see, this term will be of second order in the derivation
of the relevant derivatives for yield spreads and can be neglected in a ﬁrst approximation.
13attractive than the riskier one and hence drives up the yield diﬀerential. This
is the typical eﬀect stressed by practitioners. Our empirical strategy is to let
the data tell us the sign of the derivative. In the appendix, we show how the
positive sign arises in a simple model of imperfect but constant correlation
of bond returns.
Finally, the joint eﬀect of changes in risk and in liquidity is again ambigu-
ous, but has one dominant element. As seen above, while the direct eﬀect
of aggregate risk on the probability of liquidation — the ﬁrst term in (12) —
is always negative, the second term is ambiguous. This second term is the
product of the ﬂight to liquidity in terms of order ﬂow and the transactions
cost tB.S i n c etB is small, we expect the negative ﬁrst term to dominate.
We summarize the previous discussion in the following testable predic-
tions regarding the eﬀects of risk and illiquidity on the yield diﬀerential,
where, recalling that changes in tB are mirror images of those in tA,w e
measure illiquidity by the transaction cost diﬀerential ∆t:
Hypothesis 1. The yield diﬀerential is insensitive to aggregate risk if ag-
gregate risk aﬀects bonds of diﬀerent fundamental value identically. It is
increasing in aggregate risk if the fundamentals of riskier bonds react more




Hypothesis 2. The yield diﬀerential between the two bonds depends posi-




Hypothesis 3. The positive eﬀect of transactions costs on the yield diﬀer-




While the ﬁrst two predictions are in line with those of other existing
models of asset pricing and liquidity, the third prediction is speciﬁct oo u r
model. If, for example, bond trades are driven by consumption or endowment
14shocks, as in the OLG model of Acharya and Pedersen (2004) or the theo-
retical liquidity literature building on Diamond-Dybvig (1983), then the πi
would be constant and, from (7), yield diﬀerentials would only depend on liq-
uidity and aggregate risk directly. The cross-eﬀect identiﬁed in (15) would be
zero in this case. If bond sales were triggered by changes in consumption op-
portunities or other “supply side” considerations as in the delegated-portfolio
management model of Vayanos (2004), rather than from changes in the risk-
return proﬁle of alternative investments, the πi would depend positively on
α rather than negatively, as in our model, and the cross-eﬀect (15) would be
positive. Then aggregate risk would amplify rather than dampen liquidity
eﬀects.
5 Empirical evidence
The empirical strategy used to test the predictions of Section 4 is based on
the estimation of a simultaneous equation model for yield diﬀerentials in the
Euro area at diﬀerent maturities.
We measure the aggregate risk factor by the spread between j-year ﬁxed
interest rates on U.S. swaps, R
j
SWUS,t, and the yield on j-year U.S. govern-
ment bonds, R
j
US,t. We opt for this measure because of its high correlation
with all U.S.-based measures of risk and because of its availability at diﬀerent
maturities. In the next section we report estimates obtained using alterna-
tive measures of risk and show that our results are robust to the choice of
risk measure. We measure the liquidity factor by the bid-ask spread of each
bond. We considered a range of alternative liquidity indicators and selected
the bid-ask spread as the most signiﬁcant measure.
In taking the model to the data, we take the following speciﬁcation strat-
e g y .F i r s t ,w ec h o s ea sb e n c h m a r k sG e r m a nb o n d sf o rt h et e n - y e a rm a t u r i t y
a n dF r e n c hb o n d sf o rt h eﬁve-year maturity. Our choice is supported by the
econometric evidence provided by Dunne, Moore and Portes (2002) and by
the fact that traders regard French OATs as the 5-year Euro-area benchmark
in the same way as they regard the 10-year Bunds as the 10-year Euro-area
benchmark, because French bonds are considered as particularly liquid for
the 5-year maturity bucket.
Second, as yield spreads in the euro area are very persistent and as our
predictions are derived within a static framework, we posit the following
15dynamic partial adjustment model for yield diﬀerentials:
Yi,t − Yb,t = ρi (Yi,t−1 − Yb,t−1)+( 1− ρi)(Yi,t − Yb,t)
∗ + ui,t,
where ui,t are independently identically distributed shocks and (Yi,t−Yb,t)∗ is
the theory-consistent long-run equilibrium value for yield diﬀerentials. Third,
we augment the speciﬁcation with the diﬀerentials in the residual maturity
of the benchmark bonds in country i and the benchmark bonds to ﬁlter out
of the data the eﬀect introduced by the diﬀerent maturity of benchmark
bonds and the eﬀect of changes in benchmarks occurring at diﬀerent dates
for diﬀerent countries in the sample period.9
5.1 The baseline model
To sum up, we estimate as a baseline model the following eight-equation
model, where the dependent variables are the yield diﬀerentials relative to a





















































The index i varies across countries and the index j varies across maturities
(ﬁve and ten years). The estimation is performed by Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUR), and the empirical results are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
The estimates for the 10-year maturity yield diﬀerential are presented in
Table 4.1. The coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent variable is always signiﬁ-
cant and close to unity, which indicates strong persistence of yield diﬀeren-
tials. Also the coeﬃcient of the maturity diﬀerential variable is uniformly
9We also tried diﬀerent methods of dealing with these problems such as omitting from
the sample dates in which benchmarks are changed or constructing constant maturity
yields. We favour the use of the maturity diﬀerentials in that it is a natural way of
correcting the diﬀerentials and it allows our liquidity indicator to operate during episodes
in which liquidity might highly matter, such as at dates when benchmarks are changed.
An alternative to the maturity diﬀerential is the duration diﬀerential. However, the
diﬀerence between these two measures is not very relevant in our case given that they
both act as dummies to model the same jump in duration and maturity occurring in
occasion of benchmark changes.
16positive and signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the importance of this correction. The
corresponding results for the 5-year maturity are shown in Table 4.2. Again,
the coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and signiﬁcant,
but it is smaller for all eight countries, indicating lower persistence in the
time-series behavior of 5-year yield diﬀerentials. Also the maturity correc-
tion coeﬃcient stays positive and signiﬁcant for all eight countries.
More importantly, the coeﬃcient of the aggregate risk factor is positive
and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for all eight countries in both maturities,
in accordance with Hypothesis 1 of Section 4. It ranges between 0.3 and
0.6. for the 10-year bonds and between 0.23 and 0.68 for the 5-year bonds
(except in the latter case for Germany, where the coeﬃcient is virtually zero).
Interpreting these positive coeﬃcients from the perspective of the theory
summarized in Hypothesis 1 leads us to conclude that the fundamental risk
of non-benchmark bonds is perceived to be more strongly aﬀected by changes
in aggregate risk than that of benchmark bonds. So, higher aggregate risk
— as proxied by our U.S. swap yield diﬀerential — is correlated with wider
Euro-area yield diﬀerentials relative to the Bund, resp. the OAT.
Turning to the liquidity variable, we note that at the 5-year maturity the
coeﬃcients of the liquidity variables are positive and signiﬁcant in the case
of Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal, in line with
Hypothesis 2 of Section 4.
Finally, in line with Hypothesis 3, the interaction between liquidity and
the aggregate risk factor has always a negative impact on the yield diﬀer-
entials. This ﬁnding is substantially conﬁrmed at the 10-year maturity, al-
though the results are weakened in the case of Spain and Italy. This evidence
illustrates the importance of non-linearities in the eﬀect of liquidity indicators
on yield diﬀerentials. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient of the liquidity diﬀeren-
tial variable becomes signiﬁcant only when the interaction between liquidity
indicators and the aggregate risk factor is also included in the regression. If
the coeﬃcient of the interaction is constrained to zero, then also the level of
the liquidity indicator becomes insigniﬁcant.
This evidence does not simply reﬂect the fact that for less liquid bonds
prices take more time to absorb the change in risks. In fact, we control for dif-
ferent dynamic eﬀects across countries of the variables included in our model
by having potentially diﬀerent coeﬃcients on the lagged dependent variable.
Moreover a simple check, eﬀected by adding further lags of the included
variables, delivers non-signiﬁcant parameters for higher order dynamics.
It could be observed that our SUR estimation is ineﬃcient when valid
17cross-equation restrictions can be imposed on our model. This argument is
strengthened in the context of our theoretical model where the cross-equation
restrictions on the coeﬃcients on the measure of liquidity and on the inter-
action between the aggregate risk factor and this measure are indeed implied
by theory.
In Table 5, we explore this possibility by imposing cross-equation restric-
tions on our estimated models for 5-year and 10-year diﬀerentials. We test for
the validity of cross-equation restrictions on each coeﬃcient separately and
on the full set of coeﬃcients. Interestingly, the Wald statistics reported in
Table 5 illustrate that the panel restrictions can only be validly imposed on
the liquidity indicators at the 10-year maturity. When these restrictions are
imposed, the eﬀect of the liquidity variables is signiﬁcant and in line with the
prediction of the theory. Yet, this result does not carry over to the 5-year
maturity, where the panel restrictions cannot be imposed on the liquidity
variables. Furthermore, the panel restrictions on the coeﬃcient of the aggre-
gate risk factor are always rejected, in line with the predictions of the model
where the impact of international risk on fundamental risk is heterogenous
across diﬀerent bonds.
Summing up our empirical results are generally supportive for the impli-
cations of our theoretical framework: in particular, the aggregate risk factor
always has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on yields, and there is an impor-
tant interaction between liquidity and the international factor.
5.2 Robustness
Swap spreads can be considered a good measure of risk, for a number of
reasons. First, being diﬀerentials between bonds of the same maturity, they
are not aﬀected by the path of expected future risk-free rates and, diﬀerently
from term spreads, they reﬂect only risk premia, as they are unaﬀected by
expected monetary policy. Second, they are available at the diﬀerent matu-
rities relevant to our study, thus enabling us to account for a non-ﬂat term
structure of risk premia. Third, U.S. swap spreads provide a non-European
m e a s u r eo fr i s ka n dt h e r e f o r ea r em u c hm o r el i k e l yt ob ea ne x o g e n o u sv a r i -
able for the estimation of parameters of interest than any measure based on
European yields. Fourth, as a spread between homogenous types of bonds,
they are a superior measure of risk to the spread between Treasury bonds
18and corporate bonds.10
However, it must be recognized that swap spreads are a special measure of
risk, in that they include the counterparty risk of swap dealers,11 a n do ns o m e
occasions they might reﬂect factors not related to aggregate risk. A close
examination of Figure 3 reveals that the positive and strong comovement
between the ﬁrst principal component of yield diﬀerentials in the Euro area
and our measure of risk has a clear exception in late July 2003. At this
date, swap spreads suddenly increased for reasons related to the hedging of
mortgage-backed securities and hence little related to international factors.
It is therefore important to assess the robustness of our results.
We provide the relevant evidence in Table 6, where we report the results of
e s t i m a t i n go u rm o d e lf o rt h e1 0 - y e a ry i e l d sd i ﬀerentials on a shorter sample,
which excludes the July 2003 episode. The table also reports the evidence
obtained by augmenting the baseline regression with two alternative mea-
sures of risk. The ﬁrst is the yield spread between BBB long-term corporate
bonds and AAA long-term corporate bonds, the second is an indicator based
on the European equity market: the implied volatility from options on the
Eurostoxx 50. The results show that our estimates are robust both to the
choice of the sample size and to the use of diﬀerent measures of risk. In
particular, the results on the shorter sample fully conﬁrm the evidence from
our full sample with some slight modiﬁcation of the original point estimates.
Augmentation of the model with alternative measures of risk shows that, al-
though all alternative measures of risk are signiﬁcant, their inclusion does not
aﬀect the signiﬁcance of all variables included in the original model. Over-
all, the signiﬁcance of risk factors is more robust than that of the liquidity
factor and of the interaction term. We perform similar robustness checks for
the 5-year diﬀerentials, but for brevity we do not report the corresponding
results, which conﬁrm those obtained for 10-year spreads.
In the case of the 5-year bonds we also re-estimated the model with the
German Bund as a benchmark instead of the French OAT. This modiﬁcation
led to much less precise estimates of all relevant parameters and to a set
of results that were much less consistent with those obtained for the 10-
10Duﬀee (1998) noted that the spread between Treasury bonds and corporate bonds is
a spread between callable bonds and a mixture of callable and non-callable bonds. Given
that the response of callable and non-callable bonds to shocks in the level of the term
structure is diﬀerent, the government-corporate spread is sensitive to the level of the term
structure.
11Although, in practice this eﬀect is minimal (see, for example, Duﬃe and Huang(1996))
19year diﬀerentials. We take this as conﬁrmatory evidence of the econometric
analysis by Dunne, Moore and Portes (2002) that clearly indicates the OAT
as the preferred choice of benchmark for the 5-year maturity.
Since we have chosen a U.S. based measure of aggregate risk, a ﬁnal
robustness check concerns the inclusion of the dollar-euro exchange rate as an
independent source of risk: in all speciﬁcations, this variable is insigniﬁcant.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper explores the determinants of observed yield diﬀerentials between
long-term sovereign bonds in the Euro area. Inspection of daily data for
the early EMU period indicates that there is a strong comovement in yield
diﬀerentials of benchmark bonds, and that their ﬁrst principal components
explains more than ninety per cent of the variance. This common trend ap-
pears highly correlated with measures of aggregate risk. In contrast, liquidity
diﬀerentials — proxied, for example, by bid-ask spread diﬀerentials — feature
sizeable heterogeneity and no common factor.
To generate testable predictions about the relation between yield diﬀer-
entials, fundamental risk, and liquidity, we develop a simple model of the
interplay between aggregate risk and transactions costs. Our model has two
key novel features. First, the demand for liquidity responds to the magnitude
of transaction costs and to changes in investors’ opportunity set (rather than
being determined by exogenous liquidation needs à la Diamond-Dybvig).
Speciﬁcally, investors value liquidity less when alternative investment op-
portunities become less attractive. Second, if the payoﬀ of alternative in-
vestments covaries with that of marketable assets, being both driven by a
common factor, the equilibrium value of liquidity tends to be lower in worse
aggregate states, as determined by this common factor.
The model predicts that bond yield diﬀerentials should increase in both
liquidity and aggregate risk, with a non-linear term that captures the eﬀect
on required bond returns due to the interaction between liquidity and the
aggregate factor. We test these predictions on daily data for the Euro-area
sovereign yield diﬀerentials in 2002 and 2003. The econometric results show
that the aggregate risk factor is consistently priced, while liquidity diﬀeren-
tials are priced only for a subset of nine country/maturity pairs (out of a
total of sixteen), and that the interaction of liquidity diﬀerentials with the
risk factor is always negative when signiﬁcant, in line with the prediction of
20the model.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with those of recent papers that ﬁnd no eco-
nomically important eﬀect of liquidity variables on bond returns. In fact,
when the coeﬃcient of the interaction term between aggregate risk and liq-
uidity is constrained to be zero, liquidity becomes insiginiﬁcant throughout
our regressions.
Our data do not allow us to draw conclusions regarding the eﬀect of
cross-sectional diﬀerences in macroeconomic conditions or ﬁscal policies. For
example, simple cross-country regressions show that on average over the sam-
ple period, (average) yield spreads are positively correlated with (average)
government debt/GDP ratios, which in turn are negatively correlated with
(average) bid-ask spreads. But, being based on nine data points only, these
cross-sectional estimates have little reliability, and in our time-series analy-
sis we do not have suﬃcient variation in macroeconomic variables (such as
debt/GDP ratios) to draw conclusions about possible macroeconomic deter-
m i n a n t so ft h ev a r i a b l e st h a tw eo b s e r v e .
The implications of our analysis for policy-makers and for portfolio man-
agers are rather more subtle. From a policy-making standpoint, the empirical
estimates highlight the importance of the aggregate risk factor in determin-
ing bond yield spreads, and thus underscore the importance of good macro-
economic fundamentals to minimize exposure to the aggregate risk factor.
Instead, there seems to be little need for further action on the liquidity side,
because bid-ask spreads are already rather uniform and very small across
European bond markets, at least for benchmark bonds. Instead, the lesson
for portfolio management is that liquidity can aﬀect the risk sensitivity of
the assets being held, and that this interaction depends on the covariance of
illliquidity costs with aggregate risk. In this sense, the lesson of our model —
in spite of its simplicity — may be considerably more general than our speciﬁc
application to Euro-area bond markets.
21Appendix 1: Extension to Risky Portfolios
In this appendix, we sketch an extension of the model in which the in-
vestors’ investment opportunities are risky and imperfectly correlated. As
i nt h em a i nt e x to ft h ep a p e r ,t h et w ob o n d sc a ne i t h e rr e p a y( e Vi = V )o r
default (e Vi =0 ). The probabilities are




(V,V) with probability γ + α,
(V,0) with probability pV 0,
(0,V) with probability 1 − α − γ − pV 0,
(0,0) with probability α.
It is straightforward to show that the correlation between the two returns
is
ρ =
(α + γ + pV 0)(pV 0 + α) − pV 0 p
(α + γ + pV 0)(1 − α − γ − pV 0)(pV 0 + α)(1 − pV 0 − α)
.
Holding the correlation constant, for small values of α (which is the rel-
e v a n tc a s e ) ,a ni n c r e a s ei nα increases the variance of both bonds, hence α
c a nb ev i e w e da sa ni n d i c a t o ro fa g g r e g a t er i s k .I fw eh o l dρ constant, this
structure has two free parameters, namely the aggregate factor α and the
relative attractiveness of bond A, which can be measured by γ.
The assumption qA ≥ qB (bond A is the benchmark) implies that α +
γ +2 pV 0 ≥ 1. Under this assumption, for ρ constant, it is straightforward
(though tedious) to calculate that ∂
∂α(qA − qB) ≥ 0 for small values of α,a s
postulated in Section 4.








eh with probability α
r with probability s
r +
√
eh with probability α
where s>0, s +2 α =1 , 0 ≤ eh ≤ e.F o r e a c h h we have E e Rh = r and
var(e Rh)=2 αeh. Hence, higher α means higher risk, and the investor bears
more of the risk the greater her eh. If she is risk-averse, she will therefore
behave as if she maximized the certainty equivalent r−αeh considered in the
main text.
If risk-averse, the investor’s objective is to maximize Eu(c),w h e r eu is
increasing and concave,
c = xAe VA + xBe VB + xC(1 + r)+xR e R
h
22is ﬁnal consumption, and the xi are the investor’s end-of-period-1 holdings
of the four assets.
Because of transactions costs, the ﬁrst-order condition of this problem
depends on whether the investor buys or sells in equilibrium. As an exam-
ple, consider the case where the investor sells both bonds in order to invest
alternatively. In this case, her ﬁrst-order conditions are
E(e VA − (1 + r)(1 − tA)p1A)u
0(c)=0 ,
E(e VB − (1 + r)(1 − tB)p1B)u
0(c)=0 ,
E(e R
h − (1 + r))u
0(c)=0 .
Hence,
(1 − ti)p1iE[e R
hu















This condition on how the the excess return of each bond over the investor’s
(transactions costs adjusted) alternative return must covary with marginal
utility is a standard CAPM-type condition, with the new feature that the
alternative return is investor-speciﬁc. This “investor-speciﬁc β” gives rise to
a supply curve of bonds that is increasing in p1i, i = A,B, and decreasing in
aggregate risk α,a su s e di nt h em a i nt e x t .
23Appendix 2: Data Description
The data for 5-year and 10-year-maturity bonds from 1 January 2002 to
23 December 2003 are collected from Euro MTS Group’s European Bench-
mark Market (EBM) trading platform, at 11 a.m. CET during all market
days in the Telematico cash markets. The database contains the best bid or
ask prices across all markets, the aggregate quantity of all of the outstanding
proposals on basis of the best bid and best ask prices, and the daily trading
volume of each bond on the EBM. From these data we calculate redemp-
tion yields, maturities and a set of time-varying liquidity variables for the
benchmark bonds of each country in our sample. The countries are Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain. We constructed the following liquidity variables (in all cases as the
diﬀerence between the relevant country’s value and the value observed for
the benchmark, which was Germany for the 10-year bucket and France for
the 5-year one):
• 5-day-moving-average of the bid-ask spread (in ticks);
• trading volume for the benchmark bond, in million of Euros;
• bid-side market depth, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between bid and mid
price, divided by the bid quantity;
• ask-side market depth, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between mid price and
a s kp r i c e ,d i v i d e db yt h ea s kq u a n t i t y ;
• maximum quantity available at the best 5 prices.
After experimentation, we selected the bid-ask spread as the most signif-
icant liquidity indicator, and reported the estimates of our non-linear empir-
ical model only for this liquidity indicator.12
12This is conﬁrmed, e.g., in the study by Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2007), who ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the impacts of the four liquidity variables they construct from
the MTS data base.
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27Table 1. Descriptive statistics by country
Panel A. Euro-area yield diﬀerentials relative to Germany, 10 year maturity
(resp. France, 5 year maturity), in basis points
10-year benchmark bonds 5-year benchmark bonds
Country Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev.
Austria 10.05 9.46 7.19 3.35 0.74 9.22
France 4.16 5.62 4.36 3.57 2.37 4.70
Netherlands 6.94 6.92 4.48 6.07 5.60 6.87
Belgium 13.45 11.79 6.80 4.78 4.40 8.09
Spain 9.72 8.06 7.44 -2.16 -0.42 10.13
Finland 10.88 9.34 8.30 6.48 582 11.18
Italy 14.47 15.70 4.88 7.97 8.34 8.01
Portugal 15.50 14.48 7.73 6.46 12.03 16.76
Panel B. Bid-ask spreads in ticks
10-year benchmark bonds 5-year benchmark bonds
Country Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev.
Austria 4.60 4.4 1.10 4.11 4.00 0.64
France 2.86 2.80 0.46 2.52 2.60 0.34
Netherlands 3.55 3.60 0.50 3.75 3.80 0.45
Belgium 3.47 3.40 0.53 2.71 2.60 0.31
Spain 3.47 3.20 0.80 2.94 2.60 0.78
Finland 4.87 4.60 1.09 4.07 3.80 0.81
Italy 2.52 2.40 1.37 2.12 2.00 0.43
Portugal 4.33 4.40 0.69 3.16 3.00 0.51
Germany 3.25 3.00 0.67 3.20 3.20 0.45
28Table 2. Correlation and principal components of Euro-area yield
diﬀerentials, 10 year bonds, relative to Germany
Panel A. Correlation matrix
Country AT FR NL BE ES FI IT PT
Austria 1-------
France 0 . 6 5 1------
Netherlands 0 . 5 1 0 . 4 8 1-----
Belgium 0.88 0.72 0.61 1 - - - -
Spain 0.88 0.67 0.58 0.94 1 - - -
Finland 0.84 0.81 0.73 0.93 0.90 1 - -
Italy 0.75 0.84 0.52 0.82 0.80 0.89 1 -
Portugal 0.92 0.69 0.61 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.78 1
Panel B. Principal components
Component 1 2 3 45678
Eigenvalue 7.28 0.26 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.01
Proportion of variance 0.91 0.03 0.02 0.016 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.001
Cumulative proportion 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.988 0.99 0.998 1
29Table 3. Correlation and principal components of Euro-area
bid-ask spread diﬀerentials relative to Germany
Panel A. Correlation matrix
Country AT FR NL BE ES FI IT PT
Austria 1 . 0 0 ---- ---
France 0.22 1.00 - - - - - -
Netherlands 0.49 0.51 1.00 - - - - -
Belgium 0.39 0.46 0.44 1.00 - - - -
Spain 0.58 0.26 0.60 0.35 1.00 - — -
Finland 0.48 0.21 0.54 0.26 0.76 1.00 — -
Italy 0.09 0.37 0.19 0.26 -0.08 -0.11 1.00 -
Portugal 0.22 0.50 0.29 0.56 0.20 0.19 0.24 1.00
Panel B. Principal components
Component 12345678
Eigenvalue 3.46 1.76 0.80 0.61 0.48 0.38 0.29 0.19
Proportion of variance 0.43 0.22 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
Cumulative proportion 0.43 0.65 0.75 0.83 0.89 0.93 0.97 1
30Table 4.1 Estimation of a system of simultaneous equations for
Euro-area 10-year yield diﬀerentials
The equations are estimated by SURE, on a sample of daily observations from 1/1/2002 to 23/12/2003.
The Panel shows the coeﬃcient estimates for the 10-year maturity, spreads are on German bonds. Standard
errors are reported within brackets below the coeﬃcient estimates. An asterisk (*) and a cross (†)
indicate that the corresponding coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 and 10 percent level,
respectively.
Variable Constant Own lag Maturity Risk factor B-A spread Interaction
Austria -0.167* 0.857* 0.280* 0.546* 0.043* -0.077*
(0.026) (0.016) (0.034) (0.060) (0.014) (0.026)
Belgium -0.129* 0.936* 0.357* 0.497* 0.052* -0.099*
(0.021) (0.007) (0.040) (0.043) (0.022) (0.048)
Spain -0.135* 0.867* 0.349* 0.485* 0.007 -0.009
(0.034) (0.018) (0.061) (0.077) (0.024) (0.047)
Finland -0.159* 0.956* 0.207* 0.467* -0.01 -0.025
(0.049) (0.006) (0.045) (0.118) (0.024) (0.079)
France -0.119* 0.945* 0.184* 0.321* 0.016 -0.025
(0.038) (0.01) (0.077) (0.072) (0.038) (0.079)
Italy -0.077* 0.912* 0.288* 0.290* 0.017 -0.042
(0.021) (0.01) (0.037) (0.047) (0.018) (0.043)
Netherlands -0.076* 0.891* 0.314* 0.305* 0.034* -0.052†
(0.019) (0.012) (0.029) (0.042) (0.016) (0.032)
Portugal -0.150* 0.920* 0.384* 0.633* 0.080* -0.139*
(0.044) (0.010) (0.052) (0.099) (0.033) (0.07)
31Table 4.2 Estimation of a system of simultaneous equations for
Euro-area 5-year yield diﬀerentials
The equations are estimated by SURE, on a sample of daily observations from 1/1/2002 to 23/12/2003.
The Panel shows coeﬃcients estimates results for the 5-year maturity, spreads are on French Bonds.
Standard errors are reported within brackets below the coeﬃcient estimates. An asterisk (*) and a cross
(†) indicate that the corresponding coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 and 10 percent
level, respectively.
Variable Constant Own lag Maturity Risk factor B-A spread Interaction
Austria -0.251* 0.833* 0.170* 0.679* 0.079* -0.184*
(0.039) (0.017) (0.011) (0.09) (0.023) (0.048)
Belgium -0.082* 0.774* 0.214* 0.297* -0.022 -0.033
(0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.034) (0.018) (0.042)
Spain -0.143* 0.693* 0.210* 0.337* 0.048* -0.095*
(0.013) (0.021) (0.007) (0.03) (0.020) (0.041)
Finland -0.106* 0.606* 0.205* 0.258* -0.018 -0.025
(0.017) (0.022) (0.005) (0.041) (0.012) (0.024)
Germany -0.017 0.742* 0.168* 0.01 -0.007 0.004
(0.015) (0.018) (0.007) (0.03) (0.012) (0.026)
Italy -0.043* 0.584* 0.172* 0.231* 0.107* -0.208*
(0.016) (0.03) (0.006) (0.028) (0.017) (0.032)
Netherlands -0.123* 0.563* 0.191* 0.317* 0.017* -0.045∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.04) (0.036) (0.009) (0.020)
Portugal -0.122* 0.853* 0.240* 0.458* 0.052* -0.125*
(0.022) (0.010) (0.006) (0.05) (0.018) (0.04)
32Table 5. Testing panel restrictions
The table is based on a ﬁxed-eﬀects panel estimates for the 10-year and 5-year yield diﬀerentials. The
p-value of the Wald test of the identity restriction of individual coeﬃcients for all eight countries is shown
on the right of the relevant coeﬃcient. The p-value of the Wald test of the identity restriction of all
the coeﬃcients for all eight countries is shown in the bottom row. Standard errors are reported within
brackets below the coeﬃcient estimates. An asterisk (*) and a cross (†) indicate that the corresponding
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
10-year yield diﬀerentials 5-year yield diﬀerentials
Variable Coeﬃcient and S.E. Wald p-value Coeﬃcient and S.E. Wald p-value
Own Lag 0.956* 0.000 0.853* 0.000
(0.006) (0.006)
Maturity 0.269* 0.000 0.232* 0.000
(0.041) (0.003)
Risk factor 0.172* 0.000 0.372* 0.000
(0.063) (0.032)
Bid-ask spread 0.047* 0.207 0.039* 0.000
(0.021) (0.008)
Interaction -0.064* 0.192 -0.087* 0.000
(0.033) (0.018)
Panel restriction 0.000 0.000
33Table 6. Robustness Analysis
The table reports robustness analysis for the SURE system on 10-year yield diﬀerentials. We consider
three alternative Risk Factors. R F 1 is the swap spread, R F 2 is the diﬀerential between yields on
seasoned US BAA bonds and seasoned US AAA bonds (the source for these data is the FRED database),
R F 3 is the implied volatility in options on the EUROstoxx 50. The source for these data is Datastream.
Variable Sample Constant Own lag Maturity R F 1 R F 2 R F 3 Bid-ask Interaction
Austria 02-01-03:06 -0.135* 0.775* 0.285* 0.503* 0.05* -0.089*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.046) (0.011) (0.020)
02-01-03:12 -0.324* 0.811* 0.237* 0.388* 0.193* 0.035* -0.062*
(0.034) (0.018) (0.026) (0.052) (0.034) (0.010) (0.019)
02-01-03:12 -0.199* 0.813* 0.308* 0.492* 0.178* 0.031* -0.051*
(0.021) (0.018) (0.027) (0.047) (0.032) (0.010) (0.020)
Belgium 02-01-03:06 -0.081* 0.906* 0.317* 0.433* 0.081* -0.14*
(0.018) (0.011) (0.034) (0.035) (0.019) (0.039)
02-01-03:12 -0.252* 0.925* 0.327* 0.384* 0.148* 0.042* -0.08*
(0.039) (0.009) (0.043) (0.053) (0.041) (0.019) (0.039)
02-01-03:12 -0.177* 0.917* 0.343* 0.488* 0.174* 0.042* -0.077*
(0.019) (0.008) (0.031) (0.033) (0.003) (0.019) (0.037)
Spain 02-01-03:06 -0.10* 0.77* 0.324* 0.465* 0.034† -0.06†
(0.017) (0.02) (0.045) (0.059) (0.019) (0.034)
02-01-03:12 -0.33* 0.82* 0.239* 0.284* 0.242* 0.02 0.006
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.073) (0.053) (0.02) (0.035)
02-01-03:12 -0.17* 0.83* 0.343* 0.417* 0.203* -0.002 0.025
(0.027) (0.048) (0.048) (0.059) (0.055) (0.019) (0.04)
Finland 02-01-03:06 -0.110* 0.953* 0.127† 0.433* -0.02 -0.017
(0.069) (0.009) (0.07) (0.15) (0.03) (0.06)
02-01-03:12 -0.377* 0.944* 0.166* 0.312* 0.250* -0.006 0.02
(0.07) (0.01) (0.043) (0.101) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03)
02-01-03:12 -0.190* 0.950* 0.282* 0.527* 0.01 -0.01 0.03
(0.045) (0.006) (0.05) (0.107) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04)
34Table 6. continued
Variable Sample Constant Own lag Maturity R F 1 R F 2 R F 3 Bid-ask Interaction
France 02-01-03:06 -0.035 0.945* 0.053 0.184* 0.042 -0.062
(0.039) (0.02) (0.073) (0.069) (0.034) (0.067)
02-01-03:12 -0.176* 0.944* 0.212* 0.293* 0.057 0.01 -0.02
(0.069) (0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07)
02-01-03:12 -0.169* 0.930* 0.163* 0.307* 0.188* 0.01 -0.02
(0.033) (0.012) (0.06) (0.056) (0.056) (0.03) (0.06)
Italy 02-01-03:06 -0.027 0.88* 0.263* 0.242* 0.02 -0.042
(0.021) (0.02) (0.040) (0.043) (0.016) (0.039)
02-01-03:12 -0.108* 0.89* 0.270* 0.215* 0.114* 0.01 -0.03
(0.038) (0.02) (0.040) (0.043) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
02-01-03:12 -0.06* 0.86* 0.237* 0.292* 0.187* 0.014 -0.036
(0.015) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.023) (0.01) (0.028)
Netherl. 02-01-03:06 -0.076* 0.88* -0.07* 0.329* 0.046* -0.072*
(0.02) (0.012) (0.026) (0.037) (0.016) (0.032)
02-01-03:12 -0.183* 0.86* 0.28* 0.180* 0.130* 0.028* -0.042†
(0.03) (0.013) (0.025) (0.04) (0.03) (0.013) (0.026)
02-01-03:12 -0.097* 0.88* 0.33* 0.338* 0.333* 0.028 -0.031*
(0.02) (0.012) (0.031) (0.033) (0.043) (0.034) (0.014)
Portugal 02-01-03:06 -0.110* 0.890* 0.406* 0.598* 0.098* -0.173*
(0.013) (0.038) (0.044) (0.083) (0.029) (0.06)
02-01-03:12 -0.327* 0.90* 0.329* 0.436* 0.224* 0.06* -0.10†
(0.057) (0.012) (0.046) (0.095) (0.06) (0.027) (0.057)
02-01-03:12 -0.215* 0.870* 0.386* 0.589* 0.293* 0.049* -0.082*
(0.029) (0.013) (0.032) (0.061) (0.038) (0.020) (0.04)
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36Figure 2. Bid-ask spread diﬀerentials in the Euro area, relative to
German bonds
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37Figure 3. First principal components of Euro-area yield
diﬀerentials and the spread between the 10-year ﬁxed interest
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